This is a Preliminary
and Operational Hazard Assessment and Review for a notional police department Honeywell T-Hawk MAV program.
The Honeywell T-Hawk MAV is micro UAV with autonomous flight with
dynamic intervention and retasking, and
hover and stare capability (Honeywell, 2015).
The risk assessment matrix used is the FAA safety system
process risk assessment matrix (FAA, 2015). Risks are evaluated based on the likelihood
of occurrence, and the severity of the consequences. The likelihood and severity are applied to
the risk assessment matrix and a resultant overall risk code is
determined.
Two
of the risks identified during development of the Preliminary Hazard List as
suggested by Cooke, et al. (2006) were obstacles in the takeoff and landing
profiles, and mistakes in initial programming or mid-mission reprogramming for the
UAS (Figure 2). The initial likelihood
and severity of these two risks resulted in an overall risk assessment code of
High and Serious, respectively.
Adjusting the UAS program by creating several distinct and pre-programmed
takeoff and recovery sequences, as well as a periodic review (not more than one
year and more frequent as required by changes in the urban landscape) reduced
the risk assessment codes to Medium and low, respectively.
An operational
risk assessment and review yielded three risks in mission
operations: obstacles in the search
area, spatial disorientation of the operator in dynamic reconnaissance during
suspect pursuit, and crashing due to staying on scene for a mission with longer
than anticipated length. All three of
these risks were deemed to be high. For
obstacle planning, for each mission two qualified planners are required to sign
off on contingency plans developed for the operation. For spatial disorientation during dynamic
missions, initial and annual spatial disorientation training, as well as
recovery procedures will be enacted to address spatial disorientation when it
occurs. Finally, in anticipation of
missions that run longer than the anticipated time, designated “land out” areas would be
identified and beat cops would be trained in proper recovery of the UAS to
avoid damaging sensitive equipment.
These land out areas would allow the UAS to extend on scene time without
making the long trek back to base, and reduce the possibility that an operator
might choose to stay on scene and sacrifice the UAS so the bad guy doesn’t get
away.
The operational
risk management tool is used before a mission to assess whether the
mission is low, medium or high risk. The
gain of the mission is subjectively assessed, only high gain missions should
launch on high risk missions. This
hazard analysis demonstrates how this process can improve operations and reduce
the overall risk for accidents. In
addition the operational risk management tool can be used by operators on a
daily basis to safely assess the risk involved in a mission and make decisions
based on the overall risk and gain of the proposed mission.
References
Cooke, N. J., Pringle, H., &
Pedersen, H. (Eds.). (2006). Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles,
Volume 7. Amsterdam, NLD: JAI Press. Retrieved from http://www.ebrary.com
Federal Aviation Administation.
(2015). System Safety Process. Retrieved from:
http://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6877
No comments:
Post a Comment